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Abstract
This paper shows that a small country can have incentives to tax inbound FDI even
in a setting with perfect competition and free entry. While firms make no aggregate
profits worldwide due to free entry, they make taxable profits in foreign production
locations because their costs are partly incurred in their home countries. These profits
are not perfectly mobile because firm productivity varies across locations. Consequently,
the host country does not bear the entire burden of a tax on foreign firms, giving rise to
an incentive to impose taxes. The standard zero optimal tax result can be recovered in
this model under an apportionment system that ensures zero economic profits in each
location.
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1 Introduction
A central result in open economy public finance suggests that small countries should not
impose taxes on inbound FDI (Gordon, 1986).1 This is because a small country faces a
perfectly elastic supply of capital, and so the burden of a tax on foreign investors falls
entirely on domestic labor. It would therefore be preferable to directly tax labor instead
of unnecessarily distorting inbound investment. The existing literature has interpreted this
result to be an implication of the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) framework, where firms are
perfectly competitive and households receive no pure profits.
The current paper explains why it can be optimal for a small country to tax inbound FDI
even in a perfectly competitive setting with free entry that is consistent with the Diamond-
Mirrlees framework. I study a setting where firm productivity differences arise from uncer-
tainty associated with entry. After paying fixed entry costs in their home countries, firms
learn their productivity in each country, choose their production location, and produce under
decreasing returns to scale. Free entry into production ensures that potential entrants make
no profits in expectation, and hence there are no profits that accrue to households.2
Despite the fact that firms make no aggregate profits worldwide, they make taxable profits
in foreign production locations because entry costs are incurred in their home country. These
profits are not perfectly mobile because due to the ex-post productivity differences between
firms, some firms are inframarginal in their decision to produce in a particular country. By
taxing foreign firms, the host country is able to tax away a portion of the profits of these
inframarginal firms. While this will generally affect business creation incentives in the rest
of the world, a small country does not internalize this effect because of its negligible size.
Hence, domestic agents do not bear the entire burden of the tax, giving rise to an incentive
to impose taxes on foreign investors.
The benchmark zero tax result can be recovered in this setting under a specific system
of cost apportionment. If the initial entry costs were somehow apportioned to a country
proportionately to the total profits earned in the country, there would be no economic profits
location-by-location, just as in the standard models. With such an apportionment system,
the host country would have no incentive to tax foreign investors. We can therefore interpret
optimal zero tax results as implicitly assuming an apportionment regime that guarantees zero
profits in each location.
1See also Dixit (1985), Razin and Sadka (1991), and Gordon and Hines (2002) for alternative versions of
this argument.
2Dharmapala et al. (2011) use this type of production structure  with perfect competition, firm het-
erogeneity and free entry  to study optimal taxation with administrative costs while otherwise remaining
within the Diamond-Mirrlees framework. This entry process is also similar to Melitz (2003).
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Such an apportionment could be implemented through a specific royalty payment from
the foreign affiliate to its parent. The royalty payment would have to be equal to the
maximum that an unrelated party would be willing to pay for the parent's technology. Such
a system would not, however, be incentive-compatible because the host country would have
an incentive to either tax or limit the deductibility of the royalties.3 I also discuss several
reasons why this theoretical royalty regime does not correspond to the actual system in place
in the world.
In addition to the optimal zero tax results, this paper is related to a literature that studies
business taxation in the presence of location rents (e.g. Mintz and Tulkens, 1996; Huizinga
and Nielsen, 1997). This literature shows that countries can have incentives to impose taxes
on foreign investors if some of the profits earned by firms in a location could not have
been earned elsewhere in the world. The current paper explains how location rents from the
standpoint of a host country can exist even in a setting where free entry ensures that potential
producers break even in expectation and therefore households receive no pure profits. This
point is substantively important because it shows that a rent-like motive for taxing foreign
investors can exist even when firms are fully subjected to competitive pressures.
This paper also makes a contribution to a growing literature on international taxation
with heterogeneous firms. Most papers in this literature study settings with imperfect com-
petition,4 and imperfect competition can independently break the zero optimal tax result
because of the pre-existing distortion it generally introduces (Keen and Lahiri, 1998). Bur-
bidge et al. (2006) study interjurisdictional taxation in a perfectly competitive model with
heterogeneous firms. They analyze a setting without free entry where households receive
pure profits, deviating in this respect from Diamond-Mirrlees. The current paper, by con-
trast, is able to study international taxation with firm heterogeneity without departing from
the Diamond-Mirrlees framework. It is thereby also able to highlight the importance of the
implicit apportionment regime in settings with heterogeneous firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
studies the optimal tax problem. Section 4 discusses apportionment and royalties. Section
5 concludes.
3Huizinga (1992) and Gordon and Hines (2002) make related points in the context of the R&D expendi-
tures of multinational enterprises.
4See, for example, Chor (2009), Baldwin and Okubo (2009), Davies and Eckel (2010), Haufler and Stähler
(2013), Pflüger and Südekum (2013), Bauer et al. (2014), and Langenmayr et al. (2015).
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2 Model
2.1 Households
I study a setting with two countries: a small country and the rest of the world. The
representative household in each country consumes a tradable final good that will serve as
the numeraire, and is endowed with labor and capital. Labor is internationally immobile
with the wage in country i given by wi, while capital is mobile with rental rate r. Given the
numeraire choice, welfare in country i is given by the income of the representative household:
Vi = wiLi + rKi + Ti,
where Li and Ki are the inelastic supplies of labor and capital, respectively; and Ti is
government revenue rebated lump sum to the household. Note that there are no profits that
enter into the household's budget because free entry will guarantee zero aggregate profits in
equilibrium.
There are two points to note here in connection with Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
First, the presence of a lump sum transfer indicates that I am studying a first-best problem
instead of a second-best one as in much of the optimal tax literature. This is not an important
difference in the context of the current paper because my main result is that the optimal tax
rate on inbound FDI is positive. If such a tax is optimal even in a first-best sense, it will be
optimal a fortiori when considering a second-best problem.
Second, the Diamond-Mirrlees framework requires that households receive no pure profits,
either because there are no pure profits or because pure profits are taxed away at 100%. In
this paper, the requirement that households receive no pure profits will be satisfied directly
without a 100% tax on profits. This means that there are no pure profits in this model in
the sense relevant for the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem, even though individual firms produce
under decreasing returns to scale.5
2.2 Overview of Production
Figure 2.1 shows the logical timing of the events in the model. Ex-ante identical and
risk-neutral investors in each country pay fixed costs in their home country in order to engage
in production. By doing so, they draw a productivity parameter for each country from a
5See Dharmapala et al. (2011) for more on the connection between this type of setup and Diamond-
Mirrlees.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of Events
bivariate distribution. The investors then choose where to produce on the basis of these
productivity draws.6 This is thus a setting with firm-specific comparative advantage that
arises from idiosyncratic uncertainty associated with entry.
A free entry condition will guarantee that investors make no profits in expectation net of
the initial fixed costs they incur. Since there are a continuum of firms, zero expected profits
will imply that there are no aggregate profits. This in turn means that the representative
household in each country receives no pure profits from the activities of the firms that it
owns. An individual firm, however, can make positive or negative ex-post profits.
Firms with different levels of productivity can co-exist in equilibrium despite perfect
competition because each firm has a decreasing returns to scale production function. The
presence of decreasing returns could be interpreted in two ways. First, it could reflect
span-of-control considerations as in Lucas (1978). Second, it could reflect the presence of
some firm-specific capital as in Burbidge et al. (2006). In the latter interpretation, the
initial investment that enables production is the process by which this firm-specific capital
is brought into existence. We could thus interpret the entry process as capturing an R&D
investment with an uncertain return.
2.3 Firm Problem
With this basic setup in mind, we can analyze the model backwards starting with the firm's
problem following location choice. A firm will be indexed by a vector of productivity pa-
rameters (z˜1, z˜2), where z˜i is the productivity parameter for production in country i. A firm
with productivity parameter z˜i that has chosen to produce in country i and whose home
country is j, solves the following problem:
6What is essential for the main result in the paper is that firms receive some signal of their productivity in
both countries before choosing where to produce. The main result would still hold if there is some additional
uncertainty that is only resolved following location choice.
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max
l,k
(1− τij) [z˜iFij (l, k)− wil − rk] ,
where the choice variables l and k are the quantities of labor and capital, respectively; τij is
the tax rate faced by a firm in country i that is from country j. I will assume that domestic
firms are untaxed: τii = 0.
7 This allows us to write τij simply as τi without any ambiguity.
F (.) exhibits decreasing returns to scale and is assumed to be homogeneous of degree λ <
1. Under this homogeneity assumption, the pre-tax variable profit function piij(wi, r, z˜i) can
be written as z˜i
1/(1−λ)piij (wi, r) (see Appendix A.1 for the proof). For notational simplicity, I
will define zi ≡ z˜1/(1−λ)i and work with zi instead of z˜i henceforth. The pre-tax variable profit
function is then zipiij (wi, r). We can also define the supply and factor demand functions that
arise from the firm's problem as follows: xij (wi, r, zi), lij (wi, r, zi) and kij (wi, r, zi).
The tax system here allows for the deduction of all variable capital expenses and so the
tax is essentially a cash-flow tax. Such a tax does not distort the firm's intensive margin
decision regarding how much labor and capital to use in production. However, the tax will
still be distortionary because it will affect a firm's extensive margin decision concerning
which country to produce in. Due to the presence of this extensive margin distortion, the
assumption that variable costs are fully deductible does not qualitatively alter the main
argument made in this paper. Even if the tax base included the regular return to capital,
part of the tax burden would still fall upon foreigners.
A consideration that I have ignored here is that of potential royalty payments from the
foreign affiliate to its parent for the use of the parent's technology. This is an important
question that I postpone to section 4.
A firm chooses which country to produce in by comparing the profits it would make in
each. It will locate in country i if it makes more profits by producing in i than in it would
in the alternative country:
(1− τij) zipiij (wi, r) ≥ (1− τ−ij) z−ipi−ij (w−i, r) ,
where the notation −i refers to the country that is not i. We can define the set of firms from
j that locate in i as follows:
Θij = {z : (1− τij) zipiij (wi, r) ≥ (1− τ−ij) z−ipi−ij (w−i, r)} (2.1)
Further, I define the boundary set of Θij  where the weak inequality defining the set holds
as an equality  as ∂Θij.
7Domestic firms being untaxed is not essential to the central point of this paper. This assumption allows
us to clearly see that the incentives to tax foreign investors do not arise from potential fiscal externalities.
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2.4 Free Entry and Market Clearing
So far, I have discussed the problem solved by firms that have already drawn their produc-
tivities. I now turn to the entry process. A potential firm can choose to pay fixed costs and
thereby draw a productivity vector z from a bivariate distribution G(z) with density g(z).
Across firms, the draws are independently and identically distributed. I assume that the
components of z are not perfectly correlated and that z is bounded below at zero and has
a finite upper-bound. These assumptions guarantee an interior solution where at least some
investors choose each production location.
In equilibrium, a potential entrant makes zero expected profits net of the initial fixed
costs. The required fixed costs in terms of labor and capital will be denoted fi and φi,
respectively. The free entry condition in country j is then:
∑
i
ˆ
Θij
(1− τij) zipiij (wi, r) g(z)dz ≤ fjwj + φjr (2.2)
The left-hand side of (2.2) gives us the expected profits of a potential entrant. We need to
sum over i because a firm could choose either country as the location of production. If there
is entry in equilibrium, the free entry condition will hold with equality. Since there are a
continuum of firms, the free entry condition implies that aggregate profits net of the fixed
costs are equal to zero. Note that the presence of a continuum of firms also implies that
there is no aggregate uncertainty in this model.
The model is closed by market clearing conditions for the final good and for the factors
of production. For the final good, the condition is:
∑
i
(wiLi + rKi + Ti) =
∑
i
∑
j
mj
ˆ
Θij
xij (wi, r, zi) g(z)dz, (2.3)
where mj is the measure of entrants from country j. Since there is a single final good and
this good is the numeraire, the demand for the good  the left-hand side  is equal to world
income. The term on the right-hand side of (2.3) is the world supply of the good. We sum
over j to take into account the production of firms from each country and sum over i to
aggregate across both locations of production. The market clearing conditions for labor and
capital are:
Li =
∑
j
mj
ˆ
Θij
lij (wi, r, zi) g(z)dz +mifi (2.4)
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∑
i
Ki =
∑
i
∑
j
mj
ˆ
Θij
kij (wi, r, zi) g(z)dz +
∑
i
miφi (2.5)
The two terms on the right-hand side of the factor market clearing conditions capture the fact
that each factor is used to pay the fixed costs as well as being a direct input into production.
Note that we sum over i for capital but not labor because capital is internationally mobile
and so this market clears worldwide rather than on a country-by-country basis.
3 Optimal Taxation
3.1 Preliminaries
This section analyzes the optimal taxation of foreign firms from the standpoint of the small
country, which will be denoted as country 1. The small country takes r and w2 as given.
Since it has a negligible effect on the aggregate profits of foreign firms, it also takes the mass
of entrants in the rest of the world, m2, as given. The variables that are endogenous from
the point of view of the small country are its domestic wage, the set of firms that choose
to site in the country, and the mass of domestic firms. These variables are determined by
country 1's labor market clearing condition, the location choice problem of firms, and by
country 1's free entry condition. The nature of the small country assumption here is similar
to Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009, 2013) and Bauer et al. (2014) but in a perfectly
competitive setting rather than a monopolistically competitive one.
Before turning to the government's problem, it will be useful to define several terms. The
total after-tax profits made by foreign firms in country 1 is given by:
(1− τ1) Π12 = (1− τ1)m2
ˆ
Θ12
z1pi12 (w1, r) g(z)dz
Next, we can define the inframarginal profits earned by foreign firms in country 1 as:
R12 = m2
ˆ
Θ12
[(1− τ1) z1pi12 (w1, r)− z2pi22 (w2, r)] g(z)dz
The term inside the integral defining inframarginal profits is the difference between the after-
tax profits made by a foreign firm in country 1 and the profits it would make if it produced
in country 2. Thus, R12 captures the profits made by foreign affiliates in excess of what
they would require in order to site in country 1. These inframarginal profits are location
rents from the standpoint of the host country. They are not true rents in a global sense,
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however, because these profits enter into the foreign free-entry condition rather than accruing
to foreign households. In Appendix A.2, I derive the derivatives of (1− τ1) Π12 and R12 for
later use.
3.2 Taxes, Welfare and the Optimal Tax Rate
We can now study the welfare effects of host-country taxation. I will focus on an equilib-
rium where there are no domestically owned firms and leave the simpler case with domestic
firms to Appendix A.3. Recall that due to the choice of numeraire, welfare is given by the
representative household's income:
V1 = w1L1 + rK1 + τ1Π12
The effect of the tax on welfare is:
dV1
dτ1
=
dw1
dτ1
L1 + Π12 + τ1
dΠ12
dτ
We can evaluate this expression at τ1 = 0 to obtain:
dV1
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=0
=
dw1
dτ1
L12 + Π12
= −dR12
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
,
where L12 is the total labor used by firms from country 2 producing in country 1. The
second equality above is derived in Appendix A.2. To interpret the above result, note that
dR12/dτ1 is the effect of taxes on the inframarginal profits of foreign affiliates. This term
captures the portion of the tax incidence that is not borne by domestic agents, since a
reduction in the inframarginal profits of foreign affiliates does not affect incentives to locate
in country 1. Unsurprisingly, host country taxation will reduce these inframarginal profits
(see Appendix A.3 for the formal proof) and so the small country will necessarily benefit
from a sufficiently small tax:
dV1
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=0
= −dR12
dτ1
∣∣∣
τ=0
> 0
In addition to showing that a small tax will improve welfare, we can also derive a formula
for the optimal tax rate (see Appendix A.4 for the derivation):
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τ1∗ = dR12/dτ1d
dτi
(1− τ1)Π12
(3.1)
This formula shows that the optimal tax rate depends on two key expressions. The numera-
tor, as discussed earlier, captures the effect of the tax that is not borne by domestic agents.
To the extent the tax is borne by foreigners, the optimal tax rate will be higher. The de-
nominator captures the overall responsiveness of after-tax profits to host-country taxation.
If profits are very responsive to taxes, we expect a greater behavioral distortion, and so the
optimal tax rate will be smaller.
A key point to note throughout this analysis is that all of the derivations here would be
the same whether the total mass of entrants in the rest of the world, m2, is determined by
free entry or just fixed at some exogenous value. This is because either way, it is fixed from
the standpoint of the small country which has a negligible effect on the aggregate worldwide
profits of foreign firms. As a result, even though there are no rents that accrue to foreign
households, from the standpoint of the small country, the situation is no different from one
where the foreign households did receive rents from the activities of its firms.
4 Apportionment and Royalties
4.1 Cost Apportionment and the Optimal Zero Tax Result
In the model from the previous sections, foreign affiliates make taxable economic profits in a
host country despite the fact that there are no aggregate profits worldwide. We can obtain
zero profits location-by-location in this setting if we assume that costs are apportioned in a
particular manner. Specifically, we require that the fixed entry costs somehow be apportioned
to each country proportionately to the profits made in that country. Multiplying a free entry
condition (2.2) that holds with equality by the mass of firms that enter in country j, we
obtain:
mj
∑
i
ˆ
Θij
(1− τij) zipiij (wi, r) g(z)dz = mjfjwj +mjφjr
This condition simply states that the total profits of investors from country j excluding
fixed costs are equal to the total fixed costs incurred in entry. If a share sij of the profits
of firms from j were earned from production undertaken in i, the proposed system would
apportion fixed costs equal to sij (mjfjwj +mjφjr) to country i. Consequently, the total
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profits apportioned to country i net of the fixed costs would be equal to zero:
sij
∑
i
ˆ
Ωnij
(1− τij)mijzipiij (wi, r) g(z)dz − sij (mjfjwj +mjφjr) = 0
With such an allocation of entry costs, there would be no taxable economic profits in
the host country, and so the basis for the positive optimal tax on foreign investors would
no longer be present. A cash flow tax  which is the type of tax considered in the previous
sections  would raise no revenue. If marginal capital expenses were not fully deductible,
then the benchmark optimal zero tax results would hold directly since the small country
takes r as given. Hence, we can interpret the existing results from the literature as implicitly
assuming a system that apportions costs so that economic profits are equal to zero in each
location.
4.2 Royalties
The type of profit allocation discussed in the previous subsection could be implemented with
an appropriate royalty payment from a foreign affiliate to its parent for the use of the firm's
technology. If the foreign affiliate in i pays as royalties the profits that will be earned by
the asset, zipiij (wi, r), to the parent in j, the affiliate's pre-tax profits net of the royalty
payment would be zipiij (wi, r) − zipiij (wi, r) = 0. In this way, there would be no taxable
profits in i. This particular royalty payment would correspond to the maximum amount that
an unrelated party would be willing to pay if it knew the productivity of the asset.
Such a royalty system would not be incentive-compatible. The host country would have
an incentive to either limit the deductibility of the royalty payments or impose taxes on the
royalties (c.f. Huizinga, 1992). In fact, the royalties here would be identical to what I have
been calling profits thus far, and the entire analysis as applied to profits would then directly
apply to royalties instead. These considerations suggest that the incentives to tax royalties
can be very similar to the incentives to tax profits.8
A further point to note is that the royalty system in place in the world does not conform
to this theoretical ideal even aside from deduction limitations and taxes on royalties. First,
only certain specific aspects of a parent's overall contribution to its affiliate's productivity
will trigger royalty payments in reality. For example, if an affiliate is productive as a result of
its parent's business culture or the quality of its general administration, this will generally not
give rise to corresponding royalty payments. To the extent that such factors are important,
the affiliate would be able to make greater profits net of the royalty payments.
8It is also consistent with the fact that most countries do impose taxes on cross-border royalty payments.
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Second, the royalty under this ideal system has to be the maximum that an unrelated
party would be willing to pay. By contrast, any asset price between zjpiij (wi, r)  the profit
the parent could make by producing at home  and zipiij (wi, r) could entail mutual gains
for two unrelated parties. Thus, even a legitimate arms-length price for the asset would
in general leave some economic profits to the foreign country. Finally, the informational
requirement for such a royalty system would be unrealistic in most contexts. It would
be extremely difficult for either an unrelated party or a tax authority to determine the
profitability of a technology prior to its use in production.9
More broadly, this analysis highlights the fact that the choice of royalty system could lead
to either increased or decreased incentives to impose source-based taxes. Moving closer to
an international royalty regime that ensures no economic profits location-by-location would
have an effect that is similar to a coordinated reduction of taxes on foreign investors. On
the other hand, a royalty system that leaves more economic profits to foreign affiliates could
strengthen governments' capacities to raise revenue by taxing foreign investors.
9In this paper, I focus on firms' choices concerning the real location of production rather than the location
in which profits are reported (in contrast to Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011). A natural extension
for future work is to study the implications of firms' incentives to set royalty payments to shift profits in this
type of setting.
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5 Conclusion
This paper shows that a small host country can have incentives to tax inbound FDI even in
a perfectly competitive setting with free entry. While investors make no aggregate profits
worldwide due to free entry, they make taxable profits in foreign production locations because
part of their costs are incurred in their home country. Due to productivity differences
between firms, some firms will be inframarginal in a location, and so these taxable profits
will not be perfectly mobile. By taxing foreign investors, a host country can partly tax
these inframarginal profits, giving rise to an incentive to impose taxes. The zero optimal
tax results in the literature (e.g. Gordon, 1986) can be recovered in this setting under a
system that apportions the initial investment costs to a location proportionately to the total
profits made in the location so as to ensure that there are no taxable economic profits in any
location.
A literature based on Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) has served as the basis for much of
the policy advice in the area of international taxation. The current paper shows that one
important piece of advice that is usually taken to be an implication of this framework  that
small countries should not impose source-based investment taxes  need not hold even within
the Diamond-Mirrlees framework. The reason for this is that location rents justifying taxes
on inbound FDI can exist from the standpoint of a host country even in a setting where
expected profits are competed away by entry. This analysis thus identifies incentives to tax
inbound FDI that can exist even when firms are fully subjected to competitive pressures.
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A Proofs
A.1 Profit Function Property
In this appendix, I show that we can write the variable pre-tax profit function in the following
separable form: piij(wi, r, z˜i) = z˜
1/(1−λ)
i piij (wi, r). First, note that from the homogeneity of
the production function, we can use Euler's rule to obtain:
[Fl(.)l + Fk(.)k] = λF (.),
whereλ < 1 is the returns to scale parameter. The first-order conditions are: z˜iFl (l
∗, k∗) = wi
and z˜iFk (l
∗, k∗) = r, where l∗ and k∗ are the optimal choices of l and k, respectively. Using
the first-order condition, the firm's variable profits before taxes are:
piij(wi, r, z˜i) = z˜iF (.)− z˜iFl(.)l∗ − z˜iFk(.)k∗
= z˜iF (.)− λz˜iF (.)
= z˜i (1− λ)F (.)
Thus, the firm's variable profits are proportional to its sales. Next, we can differentiate
maximized profits, z˜iF (.)− wl − rk, with respect to z˜i using the envelope theorem to get:
dpiij(.)
dz˜i
z˜i
piij(.)
= F (.)
z˜i
piij(.)
dpiij(.)
dz˜i
z˜i
piij(.)
= F (.)
z˜i
z˜i (1− λ)F (.)
dpiij(.)
dz˜i
z˜i
piij(.)
=
1
1− λ
The above expression is a separable differential equation and can be solved as follows:
14
1piij(.)
dpiij(.) =
1
1− λ
1
z˜i
dz˜i
ˆ
1
piij(.)
dpiij(.) =
1
1− λ
ˆ
1
z˜i
dz˜i
log piij(.) =
1
1− λ log z˜i + c
log piij(.) = log z˜
1/(1−λ)
i e
c
piij(wi, r, z˜i) = z˜
1/(1−λ)
i e
c,
where c is a constant of integration. In order to solve for the constant ec, we can set z˜i equal
to 1 (an arbitrary choice) to obtain:
piij(wi, r, 1) = e
c
If we define piij (wi, r) ≡ piij(wi, r, 1), then the profits of an individual firm can be ex-
pressed as being proportional to a general term that is common to all firms: piij(wi, r, z˜i) =
z˜
1/(1−λ)
i piij (wi, r).
A.2 Expressions for dΠ12/dτ1 and dR12/dτ1
This Appendix derives expressions for dΠ12/dτ1 and dR12/dτ1.
dΠ12
dτ1
= −m2
ˆ
Θ12
l12 (w1, r, z1)
dw1
dτ1
g(z)dz
+ m2
ˆ
∂Θ12
(v · u) z1pi12 (.) g(z)ds
= −L12dw1
dτ1
+m2
ˆ
∂Θ12
(v · u) z1pi12 (.) g(z)ds, (A.1)
where L12 is the total labor used by foreign firms in country 1. In taking the derivative (first
equality above), I use a generalization of Leibniz's rule for differentiating an integral. The first
term captures the change in profits that arises from a change in the profits of inframarginal
firms, using Hotelling's Lemma to differentiate the profit function. The second term captures
the change in profits due to a change in the set of firms that locate in the country. The term
v is a two-dimensional vector that captures how the boundary set changes with the tax rate
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(i.e. the velocity of the boundary set), u is the unit normal vector and ds is the surface
differential.
The derivative of R12 can be derived in a similar manner:
dR12
dτ1
= −Π12 −m2
ˆ
Θ12
(1− τ1) l12(w1, r, z1)dw1
dτ1
g(z)dz
+ m2
ˆ
∂Θ12
(v · u) [(1− τ1) z1pi12 (.)− z2pi22 (.)] ds
= −Π12 −m2
ˆ
Θ12
(1− τ1) z1l12(w1, r, z1)dw1
dτ1
g(z)dz
= −Π12 − (1− τ1)L12dw1
dτ1
(A.2)
The third term after the first equality captures the change in the set of firms locating in the
country as a result of the tax rate change. It is equal to zero because firms on the boundary
set ∂Θ12 make no inframarginal profits by definition.
A.3 Positive Optimal Tax Rate
This appendix proves that the optimal tax rate is positive. I first deal with the case without
domestic firms  the case discussed in the main text  before turning to the simpler case with
domestic firms. For the case without domestic firms, the main text shows that the optimal
tax rate will be positive if dR12/dτ1 < 0.
R12 = m2
ˆ
Θ12
[(1− τ1) z1pi12 (w1, r)− z2pi22 (w2, r)] g(z)dz
dR12
dτ1
= m2
ˆ
Θ12
{
z1
[d (1− τ1) pi12 (w1, r)]
dτ1
}
g(z)dz
In differentiating this term, we are again using the fact that firms on the boundary set make
no inframarginal profits and so the derivative of the integral is simply the integral of the
derivative. A firm that is on the boundary set, i.e. z ∈ ∂Θ12, will be indifferent between
locating in country 1 and country 2:
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(1− τ1) z1pi12 (w1, r) = z2pi22 (w2, r)
(1− τ1) pi12 (w1, r) = a12pi22 (w2, r) , (A.3)
where a12 is the cutoff value of z2/z1 that defines the indifferent firms. For later use, note
that (A.3) implies a function a12 = γ (w1, τ1), with ∂γ/∂w1 < 0 and ∂γ/∂τ1 < 0.
Differentiating (A.3), we obtain:
d
dτ1
[(1− τ1) pi12 (w1, r)] = da12
dτ1
pi22 (w2, r)
Thus:
dR12
dτ1
= m2
ˆ
Θ12
[
z1
da12
dτ1
pi22 (w2, r)
]
g(z)dz
=
da12
dτ1
×m2
ˆ
Θ12
[z1pi22 (w2, r)] g(z)dz
Hence, the sign of dR12/dτ1 will be the same as the sign of da12/dτ1. Since higher taxes
will cause firms to leave country 1, it follows that the new marginal firm will be one that is
relatively more productive in country 1, i.e. da12/dτ1 < 0. To show this formally, we need
to use the labor market clearing condition.
With no domestic firms, the labor market clearing condition can be written as:
L1 = m2
ˆ
Θ12
l12 (w1, r, z1) g(z)dz
= m2
zmax1ˆ
0
a12z1ˆ
0
l12 (w1, r, z1) g(z)dz2dz1,
where zmax1 is the upper-bound on productivity for z1. The right-hand side above is decreasing
in w1 and increasing in a12. Thus, this expression defines a positive relationship between w1
and a12. Intuitively, at a fixed wage, the presence of more firms means that labor supply
exceeds labor demand, necessitating an increase in the wage to restore equilibrium. We
can express this relationship as a function: a12 = δ(w1) with ∂δ/∂w1 > 0. This function,
together with γ(w1, τ1) defined earlier implies that an increase in τ1 will shift down γ(.) and
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cause a movement along δ(.) corresponding to a lower wage. Consequently, dw1/dτ1 < 0 and
da12/dτ1 < 0. This should be unsurprising: higher taxes on FDI reduce the number of firms
that site in the host country and reduce domestic wages.
The case with domestic firms operating in equilibrium is simpler from the point of view of
optimal taxation because the domestic free-entry condition will fix w1. To see this, consider
the domestic free-entry condition, which now holds with equality:
ˆ
Θ11
z1pi11 (w1, r) g(z)dz +
ˆ
Θ21
(1− τ2) z2pi21 (w2, r) g(z)dz = f1w1 + φ1r
Differentiating this expression, we obtain:
−dw1
dτ1
ˆ
Θ11
l11 (w1, r, z1) g(z)dz +
ˆ
∂Θ11
(v · u1) z1pi11 (w1, r) g(z)ds
+
ˆ
∂Θ21
(1− τ2) (v · u2) z1pi21 (w2, r) g(z)ds = f1dw1
dτ1
The set of firms lost in the home country is necessarily the same as the set of firms gained in
the foreign country (i.e. ∂Θ11 = ∂Θ21). Since firms on the boundary make the same profits
regardless of which country they produce in, the total profit loss for marginal firms is thus
equal to zero:
´
∂Θ11
(v · u1) z1pi11 (w1, r) g(z)ds +
´
∂Θ21
(v · u2) (1− τ2) z1pi21 (w2, r) g(z)ds =
0.10 Consequently:
−dw1
dτ1
ˆ
Θ11
l11 (w1, r, z1) g(z)dz + f1
 = 0
dw1
dτ1
= 0
Since dw1/dτ1 = 0, it follows immediately that the optimal tax rate will be positive in this
case.
A.4 Optimal Tax Formula
This appendix will derive a formula for the optimal tax rate. As shown in the main text,
the first-order condition for the optimal tax problem is:
10Formally, this is because the unit normal vectors point in opposite directions (i.e. u1 = −u2).
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L12
dw1
dτ1
+ Π12 + τ1
dΠ12
dτ1
= 0
Using (A.1) and (A.2), we can obtain the following:
(1− τ1) dw1
dτ1
L12 + Π12
+τ
m2 ˆ
∂Θ12
(v · u) z1pi12 (.) g(z)ds
 = 0
−dR12
dτ1
+ τ1
1
1− τ1
[
d
dτ1
(1− τ1)Π12 − dR12
dτ1
]
= 0
−dR12
dτ1
(1− τ1) + τ1
[
d
dτ1
(1− τ1)Π12 − dR12
dτ1
]
= 0
Thus, the optimal tax rate is:
τ1∗ = dR12/dτ1
d (1− τ1) Π12/dτ1
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